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Abstract
A non-ideological approach to the
moral questions posed by the use of animals
for experimental purposes involves taking
into account: i) the debate that has devel-
oped since the modern age on the ontologi-
cal status of animals and on what is due to
them or we must recognize; ii) the new
frontiers of knowledge opened up by disci-
plines such as ethology, anthrozoology, ani-
mal psychology; iii) the arguments in sup-
port of or against experimentation with ani-
mals, referring also to new perspectives
opened up by methodologies commonly
defined as alternatives.
Referring to the 3Rs, an important start-
ing point is to critically consider the
impasse generated by the conflict of inter-
ests between human and animal welfare or,
in another respect, by the conflict of bene-
fits for humans - costs for animals.
Effective development of the 3Rs requires
epistemological awareness and ethical com-
petence as the assumption of responsibility
by researchers and OPBA members for the
well-being of humans and animals, giving
reasons for the choices that are made.
Introduction
D.L. no. 26/2014, art.1, proclaims that
the use of animals for scientific or educa-
tional purposes should only be considered
where a scientifically valid, non-animal
alternative is unavailable to achieve the
result. This is a principle assertion, very
demanding and difficult to apply. The defi-
nition of “desired result” raises specific
epistemological and ethical problems in
experimentation, for example the use and
function of ad hoc assumptions, as well as
the methods and modality of experimenta-
tion. History teaches that scientifically
valid, reasonable and desirable methods are
not neutral at all, but strictly connected to
philosophic, metaphysic, scientific views.
Galileo’s theories, in fact, were not scientif-
ically valid or reasonable for his time, and
raised ethical and theological issues.
A non-ideological approach to moral
issues about animal use in research involves
that: i) the debate developed since modern
age to these days about ontological status of
animals and what is required or we have to
recognize to them; ii) new knowledge
issues initiated from ethology, antrozoolo-
gy, animal psicology; iii) evidences sup-
porting or in contrast with animal use in
experimentation, with reference to new
points of view initiated from alternative
methods.
Reference to 3Rs is an important start-
ing point for critical consideration of the
impasse caused from the contrast between
human and animal “wellbeing” (that is dif-
ficult to define) or humans’ benefits – ani-
mal costs. 
We need to critically analyze (pseudo)
utilitarian approach upon which cost-bene-
fit analysis rests.
A correct cost-benefit analysis requires:
i) same consideration for all stakeholder
interests; ii) measurable and predictive con-
sequences; iii) agent neutral position; iv)
results not influenced by morally irrelevant
parameters.
All these conditions are usually not con-
sidered in the project evaluation.
J. Harsanyi introduced the notion of
“imaginative empathy” to enable an inter-
personal comparison of utilities and explain
how we can imagine to be in the shoes of
another person, simulating another’s desires
and discover his preferred course of action.
If we assume the “similarity postulate”, a
priori we can look at human reactions and
basic feelings as similar, considering differ-
ence factors. How far is possible to extend
this postulate to animals?
Researchers, ethics committees, ani-
mal-welfare bodies, do not look at the issue
of developing a related interspecific social
utility (assuming it was possible).
If we support the method of calculation,
is cost-benefit analysis the most appropriate
to answer to the question: “animal experi-
mentation can considerably reduce human
risk?”.
As to animal welfare we can consider
the issue from two perspectives. The first is
that instrumentally animal welfare is func-
tional to the experiment’s correct outcome;
the second is that humans are responsible of
animal welfare, whether in captivity or in
cohabitation with them. Anywhere, this
issue involves: i) centrality of animals’ cog-
nitive dimension; ii) the transition, both for
humans and animals, from a quantitative
(material resources based) to a qualitative
approach to welfare; iii) consider wellbeing
as opportunity of realize the capabilities in
specific contexts, and develop physical and
cognitive abilities, both species specific or
biographically gained.
Results
The result is that the management of
animal suffering in experimentation and
cost-benefit analysis (in the case of use)
must be reconsidered. We should replace
the word “cost” with “harm”.
In view of this, I support an effective,
aware, increasingly widespread use of 3R
through the implementation and the devel-
opment of an ethics competence of
researchers and animal-welfare bodies
members. Ethics competence is the ability
to make moral judgments, justifying the
choices, and the extension of ethics of care
to interspecific relations.
Environment is very important in biog-
raphy of animal used in experimentation,
just like “sentience” and opportunity of
realize their cognitive abilities in the con-
text they are living in. 
That means issues of animal use in
experimentation need to be studied and con-
sidered as processes in a complex system.
In this complex system, animal-human oth-
erness is, ethically, and requires a specific
and aware accountability: researchers and
animal-welfare bodies members have a
moral duty to take care of animal welfare. 
Moral responsibility ensures possible
well-being of animals used in experimenta-
tion, so we have to deal with underestima-
tions in customary practices. In particular,
we have to consider: i) the environmental
conditions in which animals are kept or
used influence animal’s stress and quality of
life; ii) these conditions are usually not con-
sidered as researcher’s responsibility; iii)
assessment of psycological stress must be
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associated to no invasive procedures too,
because animals don’t get easily used to
routine procedures; iv) ethics committee
and animal-welfare bodies members, often
underestimate the harm and distress caused
to animals by daily routine procedures; v)
the animals’ capacity to experience pleasure
is underestimated.
D.L. no. 26/2014, art.1 requires, ethical-
ly, that researchers and therefore animal-
welfare bodies members must assume the
burden of proof about the need for use of
animals for scientific purposes, considering
rigorously all the available alternatives. 
For this to happen there is a need for a
strong epistemological awareness and an
effective ethics competence that they can-
not delegate to experts. Everyone is respon-
sible to himself, to others (animals too) for
his choices. Everyone must evaluate critical
issues of his choices and rationally justify
them.
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